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Case

"IfIKnew Then What IKnow Now:"
The Role of After-Acquired Evidence in
Employment Discrimination Cases

at a

by BarbaraJ. Fick

Glance
BarbaraJ. Fick is an associate
professor of law at Notre Dame
Law School, Notre Dame, IN
46556; (219)631-5864.
The Age Discrimination
in Employment Act prohibits employers from
discharging employees
because of age. In this
case, after McKennon was
fired, allegedly because
of age, her employer
discovered evidence of
misconduct justifying
discharge. The employer
argued that this afteracquired evidence
relieved it of liability for
terminating McKennon
because of age. To date,
lower courts have
disagreed on the
appropriate use of
after-acquired evidence
in employment discrimination cases. Now, the
Supreme Court will
decide if such evidence
is a complete defense to
liability or if its use
should be limited, affecting only the remedy for a
proven violation.

ISSUE
Is after-acquired evidence of
employee misconduct a complete
defense for an employer's termination decision which would otherwise
violate the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act or is it relevant
only to the scope of the remedy
afforded to an employee terminated
in violation of the Act?
FACTS
Christine McKennon worked as a
secretary for the Nashville Banner
Publishing Company ("Nashville
Banner") for 39 years. In 1990,
Nashville Banner fired her; she was
62 at the time. Nashville Banner
claimed the discharge was necessitated by a reduction in force;
McKennon claimed it was motivated
by age discrimination and filed a
lawsuit in federal district court
under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (the "ADEA").
McKennon was deposed by counsel
for Nashville Banner in preparation
for trial. (A deposition consists of
answers given under oath to questions related to a lawsuit. Typically,
its purpose is to uncover information useful to a plaintiff to make its
case or useful to a defendant to
mount a defense.)

In the course of her deposition,
McKennon admitted that, prior to
her discharge, she had copied and
removed several confidential company documents. Upon learning of this
misconduct, Nashville Banner filed a
motion for summary judgment with
the district court. (See Glossary for
definition of summary judgment.)
Nashville Banner's motion alleged
that by removing the documents
without authorization, McKennon
violated her duty to keep company
documents confidential. Nashville
Banner asserted that such serious
misconduct was grounds for
immediate termination.
The district court granted Nashville
Banner's motion for summary judgment, relying on the after-acquired
evidence doctrine. 797 F. Supp. 604
(M.D. Tenn. 1992). (Under the afteracquired evidence doctrine, the misconduct of a terminated employee in
an employment discrimination case
gives the employer either complete
immunity from liability for unlawful
discharge or, at the least, limits the
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remedy available to the employee in
the event the employer is found to
have violated employment discrimination laws.) Applying the afteracquired evidence doctrine, the
district court held that when an
employment discrimination plaintiff
engages in misconduct serious
enough to justify termination even
though the misconduct was
unknown to the employer at the
time of the discharge, the plaintiff
cannot recover even if the motive
behind the original termination
was age discrimination or some
other form of unlawful employment
discrimination.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating
that "we have firmly endorsed the
principle that after-acquired evidence is a complete bar to any
recovery by the former employee
where the employer can show it
would have fired the employee on
the basis of the evidence." 9 F.3d
539 (6th Cir. 1993). According to the
Sixth Circuit, it is irrelevant whether
or not, at the time of discharge, the
employer acted in violation of the
ADEA. The Supreme Court granted
McKennon's petition for a writ of certiorari to consider the effect of afteracquired evidence of employee misconduct on the litigation of an
employment discrimination claim.
CASE ANALYSIS
After-acquired evidence, as noted
above, is evidence of an employee's
misconduct or dishonesty unknown
to the employer at the time it acted
adversely to the employee, but
which the employer discovers after
the fact during later legal proceedings. The employer then tries to
use that evidence to diminish or
preclude entirely its liability for
otherwise unlawful employment
discrimination.
The use of after-acquired evidence
has divided the federal courts of
appeals into two camps. One group,

including the Sixth Circuit which is
involved in the present case, holds
that after-acquired evidence constitutes a complete defense to otherwise unlawful employment discrimination, in effect barring both a finding of liability and the imposition of
a remedy.
The second camp holds that afteracquired evidence has no impact
on the issue of whether or not the
employer's conduct violated the law
and, thus, does not preclude a finding of employer liability. These
courts take the position that afteracquired evidence is relevant only
to the nature and scope of the remedy to be awarded to the unlawfully
terminated employee.
The use of after-acquired evidence
as a complete defense was first
enunciated by the Tenth Circuit in
Summers v. State FarmMut. Ins.
Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
While the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that after-acquired information could not have caused the
employee's discharge, it being
unknown to the employer at that
time, such evidence nevertheless
precluded a finding of employer liability and, thus, precluded the imposition of any remedy because the
employee had not been injured by a
discriminatory act. In other words,
since the employer could have fired
the employee for a lawful reason, the
employee in effect had not sustained
a legally recognized injury and,
accordingly, had no basis on which
to sue. Under this formulation of the
after-acquired evidence doctrine, it
ceases to matter that the original
reason for terminating the employee
violated one or more employment
discrimination laws.
Other courts applying the afteracquired evidence doctrine to bar
recovery have justified its use on the
equitable notion of unclean hands, a
doctrine that holds that an unclean

litigant, i.e., a litigant who has done
something wrong, cannot profit
from his or her own misconduct. In
other words, when an employee
engages in misconduct sufficiently
severe to justify discharge, he or
she should not be permitted to
recover for unlawful termination
merely because the employer was,
at the time of discharge, unaware
of the misconduct.
Lastly, some courts have held
that the after-acquired evidence
doctrine precludes the terminated
employee from even proving that
the termination constituted unlawful employment discrimination.
A factor that an employment discrimination plaintiff must prove in
order to establish that his or her
termination was unlawful is that
the plaintiff was qualified for the
job. However, after-acquired evidence of misconduct prevents the
plaintiff from proving that he or she
was qualified since the misconduct,
by definition, means that the employee was unqualified for the job.
There is a second group of
appellate courts that, as mentioned
above, holds that the after-acquired
evidence doctrine does not preclude a finding of employer liability
but is merely a factor to consider
in determining an appropriate
remedy. In the context of the
ADEA, these courts rely on the language of the statute as well as the
Supreme Court's analysis in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228 (1989).
The statutory language of the ADEA
makes it unlawful to discharge any
individual because of age. For
courts that see the after-acquired
evidence doctrine as relevant only
to remedy, the issue is whether or
not age was one of the reasons the
employer decided to fire the
employee. If so, the employer has
committed an unlawful act regard(Continued on page 67)
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less of what it subsequently discovers about the employee's on-the-job
misconduct.
These courts rely for their
remedy-oriented use of the afteracquired evidence doctrine on
Price Waterhouse. In that case, the
Supreme Court considered the
appropriate analysis when an
employment decision is based on
mixed motives. A mixed-motive
case involves employer reliance on
both an illegal reason as well as a
legitimate reason when making an
employment decision. The Court
held that the simultaneous existence of a legitimate reason can
make lawful an action that was
based in part on an illegal reason.
The Court made clear, however,
that "an employer may not...
prevail . . . by offering a legitimate
and sufficient reason for its decision
if that reason did not motivate it at
the time of the decision."
These remedy-only courts reason
that after-acquired evidence, by
definition, cannot have motivated a
decision made before the evidence
was known. Accordingly, these
courts hold that such evidence is
irrelevant to deciding employer
liability because it cannot make an
otherwise unlawful act lawful.

Finally, since these courts hold that
after-acquired evidence relates only
to remedy and not to employer
liability, they also hold that the
terminated employee has standing
to sue because he or she has been
the victim of unlawful employment
discrimination.
For the remedy-only courts, if the
employer is found to have violated
the law at the time it made its discharge decision, the employee is
entitled to a declaration that his or
her termination violated the law and
also is entitled to attorneys' fees.
Further, where the violation of the
ADEA is determined to be wilful, liquidated damages could be awarded.
(Under the ADEA, liquidated damages is an amount equal to the payment of wages lost and is awarded in
addition to the total amount of
wages lost.)
On the other hand, if the employer
proves the after-acquired evidence
would have justified termination,
the court could limit any award of
back pay to the period between the
date of discharge and the date the
employer discovered evidence of the
employee's misconduct. Moreover, in
this situation, the court could refuse
to order reinstatement.

SIGNIFICANCE
Although this case specifically
involves age discrimination under
the ADEA, the after-acquired evidence doctrine has been applied to
race, religion, and gender claims
under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act. Moreover, the analysis is potentially applicable to other types of federal antidiscrimination laws such as
the Americans with Disabilities Act
and the Equal Pay Act.
Should the Court adopt the analysis
of the Sixth Circuit and hold that
after-acquired evidence is an
absolute bar to employer liability,
the focus of many employment discrimination lawsuits will shift from
an examination of the employer's
motives to an inspection of the
employee's life and work history.
Thus, an employer would be encouraged to conduct a detailed investigation into a plaintiff's background in
the hopes of uncovering evidence
sufficient to prove after-the-fact justification for an otherwise unlawful
discharge. The prospect of such an
investigation may deter some
employees with legitimate claims
from pursuing their rights.
A decision limiting the doctrine to
remedy might be seen as a reasonable accommodation between the
rights guaranteed to employees
under federal law and the employer's
right to protect itself from employee
misconduct that might not have
come to light had an employment
discrimination action not been filed.

(Continued on page 68)
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ARGUMENTS
For Christine McKennon
(Counsel of Record: Michael E.
Terry; 150 2nd Avenue North,
Suite 315, Nashville, TN 37201;
(615) 256-5555):
1. Cases dealing with analogous
federal statutes have found that
after-acquired evidence does not
preclude liability or the award of
appropriate relief. For example, the
United States Department of Labor
limits an employer's use of afteracquired evidence in cases brought
under the Fair Labor Standards Act
and the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Worker's Compensation Act.
2. After-acquired evidence cannot
affect the legality of events that
occurred before the point in time
at which the employer was aware
of the evidence.
3. After-acquired evidence may limit
the scope of the remedy but does not
bar a finding of liability.
For Nashville Banner Publishing Co.
(Counsel of Record: R. Eddie
Wayland; King & Ballow; 1200
Noel Place, 200 4th Avenue,
North, Nashville, TN 37219;
(615) 215-3456):
1. After-acquired evidence acts as a
complete bar to all relief.
2. After-acquired evidence deprives
McKennon of standing since she has
suffered no legally recognized injury
to her rights. McKennon's misconduct breaks the causal connection
between the discriminatory motive
and the adverse employment action.
The misconduct constitutes an independent cause for the discharge.
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3. McKennon cannot prove an
essential element of her case
because her misconduct precludes
her from establishing that she was
qualified for the job.
4. The doctrine of unclean hands
bars plaintiffs claim for relief.
AMICUS BRIEFS
In support of Christine McKennon
American Federation of
Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations (Counsel of Record:
Laurence Gold; 815 16th Street,
NW, Washington, DC 20006
(202) 637-5390);
Joint brief of the Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law, the American Civil Liberties
Union, and the American
Association of Retired Persons
(Counsel of Record: William
Sheehan; Shea & Gardner;
1800 Massachusetts Avenue,
NW, Washington, DC 20036
(202) 828-2000);
Joint brief of the National
Employment Lawyers Association
and the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America (Counsel of
Record: Nancy Erika Smith; Smith
Mullin; 200 Executive Drive, Suite
155, West Orange, NJ 07052;
(201) 736-7033);
Joint brief of the Women's
Legal Defense Fund, Equal Rights
Advocates, National Council of
Jewish Women, National Council
of Negro Women, National
Organization for Women, National
Women's Law Center, NOW Legal

Defense and Education Fund,
Older Women's League, People for
the American Way, Women
Employed, Women's Law Project,
and YWCA of the U.S.A. (Counsel
of Record: Donna R. Lenhoff;
Women's Legal Defense Fund;
1875 Connecticut Avenue, NW,
Suite 710, Washington, DC 20009;
(202) 986-2600);
In support of Nashville Banner
Publishing Co.
Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America (Counsel
of Record: Zachary D. Fasman;
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky and
Walker; 1299 Pennsylvania Avenue,
NW, Washington, DC 20004;
(202) 508-9500);
Joint brief of the Equal
Employment Advisory Council, the
Employers Group, the Michigan
Manufacturers Association, the
Newspaper Association of America,
and the Newspaper Personnel
Relations Association (Counsel of
Record: Ann Elizabeth Reesman;
McGuiness & Williams, 1015 15th
Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005;
(202) 789-8600).
In support of neither party
Joint brief of the United States
and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission
(Counsel of Record: Drew S. Days,
III, Solicitor General; Department
of Justice, Washington, DC 20530;
(202) 514-2217).

